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Abstract. Perfect synchronicity in N-player games is a useful theoretical dream, but communication delays
are inevitable and may result in asynchronous interactions. Some systems such as ﬁnancial markets are
asynchronous by design, and yet most theoretical models assume perfectly synchronized actions. We pro-
pose a general method to transform standard models of adaptive agents into asynchronous systems while
preserving their global structure under some conditions. Using the minority game as an example, we ﬁnd
that the phase and ﬂuctuations structure of the standard game subsists even in maximally asynchronous
deterministic case, but that it disappears if too much stochasticity is added to the temporal structure of
interaction. Allowing for heterogeneous communication speeds and activity patterns gives rise to a new
information ecology that we study in details.
PACS. 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, ﬁnancial markets, business and management – 89.75.Fb Struc-
tures and organization in complex systems – 64.60.De Statistical mechanics of model systems
1 Introduction
When a large number of agents taking part in a multi-
player game submit their actions to a central authority
(game server, ﬁnancial market), the times at which their
actions become eﬀective are likely to diﬀer because of re-
action times, transmission delays or backlogs at the cen-
tral server. If the resulting delay is suﬃciently large, the
synchronicity of actions and payoﬀs is not a reasonable as-
sumption anymore. Yet the immense majority of the liter-
ature on games and agents assumes perfect synchronicity
(see however e.g. [1–3] for some notable exceptions).
This is problematic in the modelling of many systems,
among which the numerous ﬁnancial markets where the
actions of agents are discrete in time and asynchronous.
Most ﬁnancial market models aggregate traders’ actions
over a given period in one time step. Unless it corresponds
to sensible time periods, such as one trading day, this ap-
proach is rather artiﬁcial. While time coarsening simpliﬁes
the description of market dynamics, speculation cannot
be modelled by including all the agents’ actions in one
time step: one does not make money with a single trans-
action, i.e. in a single time step. In addition, the emer-
gence of large price and volume ﬂuctuations must also be
explained in an asynchronous setting. Finally asynchronic-
ity also originates from the heterogeneity of time scales of
market participants, which is fat-tailed, possibly a power-
law [4–6].
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This raises fundamental issues regarding macroscopic
synchronization, especially in the case of coordination and
cooperation. Here we modify the well-understood minority
game [7] by introducing a tunable time delay between the
submission of a bid and its actual inﬂuence on the global
outcome, and a tunable playing frequency.
Remarkably the structure of mean-ﬁeld models such as
the MG is preserved; as a consequence there is hope that
the resulting asynchronous interaction somehow still be-
longs to the mean-ﬁeld category, hence, that the powerful
methods from statistical mechanics that solve the original
model [8,9] can be generalized.
2 Desynchronizing global games
Let us consider a global synchronous game. Each agent
i = 1, · · · , N takes action ai(t) at time t. His payoﬀ is a
function of his own action and of the global action of all
the agents A(t) =
∑N
j=1 aj(t): everything can be written
as a function of time t only.
A way to desynchronize the agents while preserving
the global structure of the game is to think in terms of
delays: if agent i submits his action at time t, the latter
becomes eﬀective (i.e. is incorporated into A) only at time
t+ δ. But at time t+ δ, A(t+ δ) only contains the actions
eﬀective at that time, that is, does not contain the ac-
tion of some other agents that are still being transmitted
or thought about. Thus, the payoﬀs of the agents at this
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Fig. 1. Schematic explanation of playing period T , time delay
δ, bids b(t) and actions a(t + δ).
time do not reﬂect the most recent actions, but only the
last known actions. Diﬀerentiating between actions sent
but not eﬀective yet, thereafter called bids and denoted
by bi(t), and actual actions ai(t) makes it easy to intro-
duce asynchronous actions while keeping intact the payoﬀ
structure, as will be shown in the next section (see Fig. 1).
Mathematically, agent i submits his bid bi(t); between
times t and t + δ− 1, his last known action is unchanged;
at time t+δ, the last bid becomes eﬀective, i.e. ai(t+δ) =
bi(t) and of course A(t + δ) =
∑
i ai(t + δ); agent i then
receives his payoﬀ that depends on ai(t+ δ) and A(t+ δ).
In this way, a non-trivial structure of overlapping bids and
actions can be built.
The temporal structure of the game is completely spec-
iﬁed by assuming that agent i is active at times t(n)i , n > 0.
For instance, t(n)i = nTi + φi where n is an integer. The
maximally asynchronous case corresponds to Ti = N and
φi = i: only one agent is active at each time step. Alter-
natively, an agent may be active with some probability
at each time step, thereby removing the rigid structure
imposed by periodic t(n)i .
3 Example: minority games
The minority game (MG thereafter) is a prototype model
of global competition between adaptive agents [7,8].
Well-understood [8,9], it provides an ideal test-bed for
new ideas and extensions. At the same time, it has highly
non-trivial and characteristic ﬂuctuations structure and
phase transition. The existence of a phase transition with
symmetry breaking [10,11] is robust with respect to a sur-
prising number and types of modiﬁcations [8,12]; as such,
if present in modiﬁed games, it is a signature that the
original dynamics has not been overly altered.
The aim of the agents is, as the name of the game
implies, to be in the minority: in the original game, agent
i takes action ai(t) ∈ {−1, 1}; A(t) is deﬁned as above
and is positive if the majority chose +1 and vice-versa.
The payoﬀ of agent i is −ai(t)A(t): those who happen to
be in the minority are rewarded.
The various types of minority games found in the lit-
erature diﬀer mostly in their learning and decision mech-
anisms. The original one is deﬁned as follows: agents are
fed with the last m winning decisions, a bitstring called
history and denoted by μ(t). Each agent has a set of S
strategies, i.e., of predeﬁned ways to react to all pos-
sible public pieces of information. Denoting the strate-






where si(t) is the strategy trusted by
agent i at time t.
Which strategy to choose is determined by reinforce-
ment learning. To this eﬀect, since the agents gather infor-
mation about the world through the use of their strategies,
they store experience about the past in virtual perfor-
mance scores of their strategies that evolve according to
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t)− aµ(t)i,s A(t). (1)
The agents choose their best strategy at time t. In other
words, si(t) = argmaxs Ui,s(t).
When desynchronizing the game, a slight complication
with respect to game histories arises: whereas in perfectly
synchronized games μ(t) is the same for all the agents,
this cannot hold anymore in asynchronous settings since
all the agents do not see the same A when they receive a
payoﬀ. Thus each agent has his own history of the game,
which encodes the past m right choices for him.
By construction 〈A〉 = 0. We shall be interested in the
ﬂuctuations of the global outcome σ2 = 〈A2〉 which quan-
tify the degree of coordination of the players, the bench-
mark being the random outcome σ2 = N . Predictability
must be measured at the individual level: one deﬁnes the
conditional average of the attendance from the point of
view of agent i, that is, conditional to his histories, which
we denote as 〈A(i)|μi〉, and the predictability as seen by
this agent Hi =
∑
µi
〈A(i)|μi〉2/P , where P = 2M , while
the average predictability is H =
∑
i Hi/N .
Predictability H > 0 corresponds to a (conditional)
symmetry breaking between the two choices. The stan-
dard game is characterized by a predictable phase (H > 0)
for α = P/N > αc, an unpredictable phase (H = 0,
α < αc) and critical point αc = 0.3374 . . . where H → 0
and σ2/N reaches a minimum [8–11]. The presence of this
phase transition is acknowledged to be robust with respect
to many modiﬁcations of the game, except when all the
agents take into account their impact on the game by re-
moving their contribution to A, i.e., by replacing A with
A−i = A − ai(t) in equation (1) [12,13]. However, little
is known about the importance of the synchronization of
histories with respect to the existence of the phase transi-
tion. Local games are synchronized MGs where an agent
plays against his neighbors, giving rise to partially spa-
tially overlapping games, hence, histories [14,15], whereas
the overlaps are in time in our case.
Another issue is the information ecology: given the fact
that predictability is easily measured, MGs give insights
on who exploits whom [16], that is, in this case, on the risk
associated with delays, for instance. Since the MG is a neg-
ative sum game, making an average positive gain is hard;
it is only achieved in the original game by some agents that
can exploit very eﬃciently the predictability left by other
agents, such as e.g. some of those able to settle on one
strategy in the standard game (frozen agents) [10,11,16],
speculators feeding on producers, insider trading or a
longer history length deep in the unpredictable phase [16].
Recently two of us designed and studied synchronous MGs
where the agents had heterogeneous time scales [17]. Here
















Fig. 2. (Color online) Fluctuations σ2/N (red squares; right
scale) and predictability H/N (black circles; left scale) of the
maximally asynchronous MG as a function of α = P/N . M = 4
(P = 16), S = 2, 400NP iterations, 200NP time steps until
equilibration, averages over 200 samples.
we shall characterize the importance of communication
delays and frequency of play.
3.1 Results
Numerical simulations are about N times slower than
those of the usual MGs, as one eﬀective time-step from a
measurement point of view ends when all the agents have
updated their actions. Even worse, the interesting regions
are found for quite low α = P/N , which makes compu-
tations even slower. This unfortunately limits the system
sizes one can study with current computers to M = 4, i.e.
P = 16. Indeed one run for the maximally asynchronous
case at P = 32 and P/N = 0.01 needs 150 min a mod-
ern computer (Core 2 duo, 2 GHz), hence averaging over
200 samples requires 20 days just for this point. Fortu-
nately, M = 4 yields good enough results, as discussed in
the concluding section.
3.1.1 Maximally asynchronous game
Assuming that t(n)i = nTi + φi as above and setting Ti =
T = N and φi = i, there is only one active agent at each
time step, hence A changes at most by 2 in a time step. In
this case, the histories μi of agents 1 and N/2 will likely
diﬀer, unless the dynamics of A has a memory longer that
N/2.
Plotting as usual σ2/N and H/N reveals that this sys-
tem undergoes the same phase transition as the original
minority game (see Fig. 2). This means that the desyn-
chronization we propose has the remarkable property to
keep the global structure of the game unchanged, while
allowing for extreme asynchronicity. It is notable that the
predictability is orders of magnitude smaller than σ2/N ,
which is to be expected since the very long time delays Ti
of the agents dilutes information; the order of magnitude
of the ﬂuctuations on the other hand is unchanged, since
A ∝ √N .

















Fig. 3. (Color online) Autocorrelation of A(t) in a population
with heterogeneous time delays Ti; M = 4 (P = 16), N = 51,
S = 2, 400NP iterations, 200NP time steps until equilibration.
The auto-correlation of A reveals a complex pattern,
similar to that seen in Figure 3: since A is only possibly
changed by only one agent at a time, it displays persis-
tence for O(N/2) time steps. After this decay, it shows
on average negative auto-correlation, as can be expected
in a minority game where every deviation from A = 0
tends to be cancelled by adaptive agents. The additional
oscillations are of period N .
3.1.2 Heterogeneous time delays
The pattern of auto-correlation of A suggest that playing
with a high frequency allows one to take proﬁt from the
persistence of A.
Drawing at random Ti from {1, · · · , ρN} and setting
δi = Ti, allows one to study the respective gains associated
with a time scale denoted by 〈g|T 〉 = 〈g|δ〉, in order words,
the information ecology that arises from being active more
often and having a shorted delay in an asynchronous set-
ting. Figure 4 shows that in asynchronous situations being
faster is an clear advantage, a few of the agents reaping
even positive gains.
Positive gains come quite peculiarly for minority games
from the unconditional persistence of A. Computing the
autocorrelation. 〈A(t)A(t + τ)〉 (Fig. 3) shows a mem-
ory of A lasting N/2 time steps, which corresponds ex-
actly to the point where the losses of the agents satu-
rates in Figure 4. Earning a positive gain, though, requires
enough persistence to overcome the cost of play the MG,
a negative sum game.
3.1.3 Activity frequency and time delays
In the two previous subsections, one assumed that the
frequency of activity of a given agent is exactly equal to
his time delay. This restriction is unrealistic and can be
lifted easily: assume that an agent plays every Ti time
steps and has a time delay of δi. The delay δi may happen









Fig. 4. Average gain of agents with a given time delay Ti
versus Ti M = 4 (P = 16), N = 101, S = 2, 400NP itera-
tions, 200NP time steps until equilibration, averages over 105
samples.
Fig. 5. (Color online) Contour plot M = 4 (P = 16), N = 101,
S = 2, 400NP iterations, 200NP time steps until equilibration,
averages over 105 samples.
to be larger than Ti: if an agent is unfortunate enough to
have a larger delay than activity frequency, he waits for
δi time steps to receive his payoﬀ and sends a new bid at
the next possible activity time t(n)i .
The average gains conditional on δ and T , denoted by
〈g|δ, T 〉, reveal in more details the information ecology of
asynchronicity: Figure 5 reports a contour plot of 〈g|δ, T 〉;
T and δ play a similar role: the more frequently one is
active, the more one can proﬁt from the persistence of
A, i.e., from the slowness of other players, as before. But
δ, which can be seen as the quickness of reaction to new
information, is expectedly the most relevant parameter: it
mainly controls whether one obtains a positive or negative
gain, except around δ = 4, where T plays this role; the
gain decreases as T increases, which is consistent with
the results of the previous subsection. The last feature of
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Fig. 6. (Color online) Predictability H/N and ﬂuctuations
σ2/N as a function of α = P/N for Poissonian activity (θ = 1).
M = 4 (P = 16), S = 2, 400NP iterations, 200NP time steps
until equilibration, averages over 200 samples.
fact that the players who have δ = T + 1 have eﬀectively
T ′ = 2T , hence the slight decrease of average gain.
3.1.4 Poissonian activity
Finally, let us relax completely the periodicity of agent
activity: each agent i plays now at time t with probability
θ/N ; the standard MG is recovered when θ = N . We ﬁrst
take θ = 1, which is stochastically equivalent to the setup
of Section 3.1.1, except that the temporal interaction has
no more structure. Figure 6 suggests that the phase tran-
sition disappears completely, at least for the range of pa-
rameters we swept over (we tried also tried individual runs
at α = 0.001 that conﬁrm this result).
This means that at least some structure of overlap be-
tween the histories of the agents is a crucial ingredient of
the phase transition. If the phase transition is resilient to
some stochastic perturbation of the personal history up-
date temporal structure, one should ﬁnd a critical θc for
which a system placed in the symmetric phase undergoes
a phase transition when sweeping over θ. The best way
to test for a phase transition is to plot the fraction of
frozen agents, φ, deﬁned as the fraction of agents which
played the same strategy during the last half of the time
steps [11]. The only situation for which φ = 0 can occur is
when H = 0. Figure 7 shows that the system stays in the
symmetric phase as long as θ/N ≥ θc/N 	 0.5 and then
φ increases rapidly. The ﬂuctuations drop discontinuously
at θ = 1: anergordicity is broken by stochasticity, but the
system stays in a symmetric phase.
4 Discussion
We have proposed a powerful and generic way to desyn-
chronize global games while preserving their structure.
The resulting asynchronicity allows for the study of the


















Fig. 7. (Color online) Fraction of frozen agents φ and ﬂuctu-
ations σ2/N as a function of θ/N for Poissonian activity for
a single realisation of the disorder. M = 4 (P = 16), S = 2,
80 000NP/θ iterations, 4000NP/θ time steps until equilibra-
tion.
eﬀect of time delays and playing frequency in principle in
any N -player game.
Desynchronized MGs provide yet another example
of the robustness of the phase transition in MGs (see
the many other phase transition-preserving modiﬁcations
listed in [8]). We did not study in detail the location of this
phase transition; additional lengthy numerical simulations
are needed to study this point in detail, in particular as a
function of T .
The fact that the phase transition disappears in the
presence of strong enough stochastic desynchronization is
a clue that this robustness relies on the temporal struc-
ture of individual history updates, as also conﬁrmed by
the fact that history-less games (P = 1) [18,19] do not
reproduce the delay information ecology found in the
present study. Interestingly, recent work on the Prisoner’s
Dilemma showed that similar Poissonian desynchroniza-
tion leads to a ﬁrst order phase transition at ﬁnite activity
frequency [20].
Although we had to consider quite small systems
(M = 4), the results presented here will not change qual-
itatively when simulating much larger systems is doable.
Finite size eﬀects of minority games are well-studied [8];
two points are crucial: (i) all the macroscopic variables de-
pend only on α = 2M/N , up to ﬁnite size eﬀects; (ii) the
existence of the phase transition is found for all M > 1. It
should be noted that macroscopic variables (H/N , σ2/N)
of the MG with real histories may have peculiar ﬁnite size
eﬀects for very small M because of the De Bruijn graph
on which bitstrings of length M live; when M ≥ 4, its
complexity is large enough to prevent the histories of the
game to be stuck in a small trivial subgraph.
The familiar phase structure of asynchronous games
suggests to solve this kind of games with mathematical
methods that have been successfuly applied to the original
MGs and some of its extensions [8,9]. Two new problems
arise: ﬁrst actions are delayed, which makes the whole cal-
culus more complex; the second problem comes from the
fact that each agent has his own real history: solving the
standard MG with real (global) histories was a mathemat-
ical tour de force [9,21]; solving systems with individual
histories will need an even more impressive feat. Never-
theless, there is nothing in principle that makes the com-
putation infeasible, although it will be much more com-
plex. We hope that such future work will reveal the inner
dynamical eﬀects of asynchronicity.
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